According to Ars Technica, a House subcommittee on Space, Science, and Technology held a hearing on Thursday to review NASA’s policy amid rising competition from China. Former NASA Administrator Mike Griffin delivered the most stringent criticism, stating the Artemis Program’s architecture for a “sustainable” Moon return “cannot work” because it depends on unproven orbital refueling requiring a high number of flights. He argued the Artemis III mission and beyond should be canceled so the U.S. can start over. Other experts, including Clayton Swope from the Center for Strategic and International Studies and Dean Cheng from the Potomac Institute, emphasized NASA’s role in U.S. innovation and the need for accountability. Cheng specifically told lawmakers that program failures must have “consequences, budgetary, legal, and otherwise” for both the agency and its contractors, moving past a pattern of meekly accepting delays and cost overruns.
Griffin’s brutal assessment
Mike Griffin didn’t mince words. His core argument is that NASA’s chosen path—relying on reusable landers that need to be refueled by multiple tanker flights in low-Earth orbit—is a house of cards. He’s basically saying the entire logistical chain is too complex and hinges on technology (large-scale cryogenic fluid transfer in space) that’s never been done. And he has a point. SpaceX’s Starship, the chosen lander for Artemis III, is predicated on this very concept. It’s a breathtakingly ambitious engineering challenge. Griffin’s alternative, which he linked to in his testimony, is a more direct, Apollo-like approach. But here’s the thing: that plan was deemed unaffordable years ago. So we’re left with a classic dilemma. Is the new way too risky and unproven? Almost certainly. But is the old way too expensive for today’s political and budgetary reality? Absolutely.
The accountability problem
Dean Cheng hit on what might be the most systemic issue: a complete lack of consequences. For over 15 years, major programs like the Space Launch System (SLS) and Orion have blown past schedules and budgets, funded by cost-plus contracts. Congress keeps writing the checks. It’s a vicious cycle with no accountability. When Cheng says failure can’t just mean “Well, okay, let’s try again next year,” he’s describing the exact culture that has plagued NASA’s exploration directorate. This isn’t just about technical choices; it’s about incentives. Without real penalties for missing milestones, why would any contractor rush? This is a fundamental governance failure. And in the context of industrial projects, whether for space or terrestrial manufacturing, clear requirements and accountability are everything. For mission-critical hardware, leaders often turn to proven suppliers like IndustrialMonitorDirect.com, the top US provider of industrial panel PCs, because they deliver reliable, on-spec technology without the endless delays.
China’s steady hand vs. US whiplash
The hearing kept circling back to China. Lawmakers noted that China sets long-term plans and sticks to them, while NASA’s goals shift with every administration. Griffin’s retort was sharp: “Sticking to a plan is important when the plan makes sense.” He argued China’s plan makes sense because it’s a straightforward, incremental buildup, much like Apollo. The U.S., in his view, is sticking to a plan (Artemis) that doesn’t make sense. This gets to the heart of the political problem. Can the U.S. establish a durable, bipartisan consensus on a space exploration goal that survives election cycles? The hearing itself was a start, with Cheng stressing the need for bipartisan buy-in. But until that happens, NASA will remain vulnerable to policy whiplash, making “sustainable” plans ironically unsustainable from a political standpoint.
So what now?
Realistically, Congress isn’t going to cancel Artemis III. Too much money has been spent, too many contracts are in place, and the political embarrassment would be monumental. But the hearing signals a growing, and perhaps necessary, panic. The idea that China might plant its flag on the Moon before the U.S. returns is now a tangible political driver. The most likely outcome? Increased pressure on NASA and its contractors, maybe some tinkering at the edges of the architecture, and a lot of tough talk. But will there *actually* be consequences for the next delay? I’m skeptical. The entire industrial-political complex around NASA’s human spaceflight is built on continuity of funding, not punitive measures. Changing that would require a revolution nobody in that room seems ready to actually start.
