IMD SolutionComputing LibraryShop main store

Explainer

IEC 62443-4-1 certificate versus compliance claim for gateways

OT cybersecurity Published 8 min read

Short answer

A compliance statement is the manufacturer's own claim; an IEC 62443-4-1 certificate is an independent attestation of the development lifecycle, with a scope and validity. Neither certifies your installed gateway configuration, so neither by itself replaces a penetration test: request and verify the certificate, and keep the test unless the customer's security authority accepts the alternative in writing.

On this page
  1. What does an IEC 62443-4-1 certificate actually cover?
  2. Is a compliance statement in the documentation the same as a certificate?
  3. What is the difference between IEC 62443-4-1 and IEC 62443-4-2 certificates?
  4. Can an IEC 62443-4-1 certificate replace a penetration test?
  5. How do I verify a certificate covers the gateway being supplied?
  6. What do I request when the documentation only claims compliance?
  7. Who can waive the penetration test requirement?
  8. What changes when a new gateway joins a network that was already tested?
  9. Questions asked

A sentence in a gateway manual saying the product complies with IEC 62443-4-1 is a claim, not a certificate, and neither the claim nor the certificate, on its own, is a reason to drop the penetration test your customer required for the last device that joined this network. IEC 62443-4-1 certifies the manufacturer's secure development lifecycle — the process that produced the product — not the gateway as you will configure, connect and expose it. Request the issued certificate and its scope attachment through the manufacturer's official channels, verify it against the body that issued it, and keep the test on the plan unless the customer's security authority accepts a documented alternative in writing.

What does an IEC 62443-4-1 certificate actually cover? #

It covers the manufacturer's secure development lifecycle and nothing else: an independent certification body has assessed how the organization defines security requirements, designs, codes, tests and maintains the product, and the certificate names the organization and scope that assessment covered.

IEC 62443-4-1 is the part of the ISA/IEC 62443 series — the standards that address the security of industrial automation and control systems across their lifecycle — that sets process requirements for developing products securely. In practical terms it demands eight things from the developing organization: a managed security process, security requirements defined for the product, secure design backed by threat modeling, implementation under documented coding guidelines, security verification and validation testing, handling of reported security flaws, managed security updates, and security guidance written for the user.

A certificate means a certification body audited those processes and found them followed, at a stated maturity level — published 4-1 certificates name the level, level 2 among them, so the level is part of what you are handed. What the certificate never states is that your gateway, with your firmware revision, your enabled services and your network placement, is secure. That question belongs to other evidence.

Is a compliance statement in the documentation the same as a certificate? #

No — a sentence in a datasheet or manual saying the product complies with IEC 62443-4-1 is the manufacturer describing its own process, while a certificate is a third party's attestation issued with a scope attachment, validity dates and a named assessed organization.

When you find the claim in documentation, record three things before anything else: the document title, its revision, and the exact sentence making the claim. That record is what you hand to the manufacturer when you ask for the certificate behind the wording.

Vendors announce certification programs while the certificates do not exist yet. A statement that certification is forecast, planned or in progress is a schedule, not a status: on the day you read it, there is no issued certificate to verify. The distinction your customer cares about is simpler than the wording — either an independent body has issued an attestation you can hold and check, or it has not, and until it has, the connection follows the acceptance path the customer already applies.

What is the difference between IEC 62443-4-1 and IEC 62443-4-2 certificates? #

IEC 62443-4-1 certifies the process that developed the product, while IEC 62443-4-2 certifies the product itself — its technical security capabilities, assessed at a security level from SL1 to SL4 — so a customer asking for proof about the device needs a 4-2 certificate, and a 4-1 certificate will not answer it.

IEC 62443-4-2 states technical requirements for the component: how it identifies and authenticates users, controls access, protects data, logs events, and governs its own use of resources. The lowest level means resistance to casual or coincidental violation, the highest assumes an attacker using sophisticated means and resources, and each step between assumes a more capable, better-resourced adversary than the one below.

The two certificates are frequently issued together, because a complete product story needs both: a disciplined process (4-1) and a product that meets technical requirements at a stated level (4-2). When the customer's requirement is about the device's own capabilities, ask for the 4-2 certificate and its level.

Can an IEC 62443-4-1 certificate replace a penetration test? #

No — the two answer different questions: the certificate says the product came out of a disciplined security development process, and the test says whether the configuration you actually installed, on the network you actually have, held up against attack on the day it ran.

The security testing that counts under 4-1 happens during development, against the vendor's own reference setup, as part of the process being certified. Your deployment is a different object: a specific firmware revision, a specific set of enabled services, specific credentials and firewall rules, on a network the certification body never saw.

Evidence The question it answers What it does not tell you
Compliance statement What the vendor claims about its development process That any independent assessment took place
IEC 62443-4-1 certificate The development lifecycle was assessed, within the stated scope Anything about your installed configuration
IEC 62443-4-2 certificate The product meets technical requirements at a stated level Whether your deployment preserves them
Penetration test Exploitable weaknesses in the tested setup, interfaces and date The vendor's process, and anything outside the test scope

Decision for the common case: submit the certificate as supporting evidence and keep the penetration test on the commissioning plan. The two cover different ground, and a complete acceptance file carries both.

How do I verify a certificate covers the gateway being supplied? #

Check the document for five items — the issuing body, the named organization, the scope attachment, the validity dates and the maturity level — then confirm the certificate's number and status in the issuing body's own public listing before it goes to your customer.

Read the scope attachment against the purchase, not just the certificate face. The attachment is where products, product families, firmware versions and the assessed organization's sites are listed. If the gateway being supplied runs a firmware revision the attachment does not list, the certificate does not cover it — that is a document gap you resolve with the manufacturer, not a judgment you negotiate with the customer.

Worked example, with hypothetical numbers. The certificate that arrives is dated issued 15 January 2025 with a three-year validity, so it expires 14 January 2028. Your acceptance gate is scheduled for 31 October 2027. Margin: 2028-01-14 minus 2027-10-31 = 30 days in November + 31 days in December + 14 days in January = 75 days. The certificate is valid on the acceptance date and can be submitted, and any firmware step or revalidation landing after 14 January 2028 falls outside it — so the re-check goes in the schedule before that date, not after.

What do I request when the documentation only claims compliance? #

Ask the manufacturer's official support or distributor channel for the issued certificate itself, the certification body that issued it, the scope attachment, validity dates and a written explanation of how the scope covers the exact product and firmware revision being supplied.

Put the request in writing and make it specific. "The documentation mentions the standard" is not one of those deliverables; the deliverable is the certificate, or a status letter saying where certification stands.

If the answer is that certification has not started, ask for that status in writing together with the security documentation the vendor can stand behind today, and file both in the project security record with the dates. The record then shows what was asked, what arrived and when — which is exactly the trail a customer's security authority will ask to see before considering any change to the test plan.

Who can waive the penetration test requirement? #

Only the customer's designated security authority — the person who owns the risk of the connected asset — and only in writing that names which tests are waived, for which configuration and firmware, with the retained or deferred tests listed alongside.

A vendor's assurance, an integrator's recommendation and a verified certificate are all inputs to that authority; none of them amends the requirement. A waived test is a security control taken out of service, so the residual risk has to be accepted by the party that carries it, not by the party that sold the gateway. The waiver record should name the tests waived, the tests retained or deferred, the configuration and firmware it covers, and the date. Decision: no written acceptance from that named authority, and the test stays on the plan.

What changes when a new gateway joins a network that was already tested? #

The earlier test's findings carry over only for conditions that are genuinely unchanged, so compare firmware identity, enabled services, management access, network placement and credential handling between the tested device and the new gateway before claiming any coverage.

A segment that was tested once does not stay tested when a different device is attached to it, because the replacement brings its own services, firmware and management paths. Treat only the matching items from your comparison as covered by the earlier work, and establish the installed baseline against the vendor's own hardening documentation, so the configuration you test is the configuration you run.

Certificate evidence sits beside the network controls, not in place of them, and the case for why layered OT security controls protect a network path applies to the gateway segment as much as to the controllers behind it.

The three cases, decided: certificate in hand and verified against its issuing body — submit it as supporting evidence, and the test stands unless waived in writing; documentation claim only — request the package through official channels and connect under the acceptance path already in force; certification not yet started — the test is the evidence, and the certificate question is revisited the day one is issued.

Questions asked

Where can I confirm an issued IEC 62443 certificate is genuine?

Most industrial certificates are issued under a scheme such as ISASecure or the IECEE conformity scheme, and both maintain public certificate listings searchable by certificate number or holder name. If the document names no issuing body, or the body cannot confirm it, treat it as unsupported and ask the manufacturer again through its official channels.

Our vendor says certification is planned but has not started; what can we use meanwhile?

The process outputs that IEC 62443-4-1 requires are things you can ask for today: the security guidance written for users, the update and patch process, and the route for reporting and receiving fixes for security flaws. They are supporting evidence, not substitutes for a certificate, so connect under the acceptance path your customer already applies and revisit when a certificate is actually issued.

Does an IEC 62443-4-2 certificate remove the need for the test?

No. A 4-2 certificate is assessed on the vendor's reference configuration, with stated assumptions and exclusions, and the security level a system actually achieves is a property of the deployed system under IEC 62443-3-3, not of the component alone. Misconfiguration, such as default accounts or unused services left open, can drop the achieved level below the certified one, which is exactly what a deployment test checks.

Does a certificate issued to the parent company cover the gateway we buy?

Only if the scope attachment says so. The attachment names the organization and development sites that were assessed, so a different legal entity, a product line added by acquisition, or a new development site can fall outside the scope until the certificate is updated. Match the entity and site on the attachment against the vendor behind your purchase order before you submit it.

Keep reading

  • Comparison

    Why layered OT security controls protect a network path

    No single control secures an OT request path. Network reachability, session protection, user identity and host hardening each block a different failure, so commissioning verifies them in that order: route first, then TLS and certificates, then login and role permissions, then the hardened baseline. A host that answers a connection proves none of the other three.

    OT cybersecurity

  • Comparison

    Connect a PLC to the plant network without exposing drives

    Keep the PLCs, HMIs and drives on one dedicated machine subnet and connect it upward through exactly one controlled boundary. A routed firewall, a second Ethernet interface such as the CP 1243-1, or a 1:1 NAT switch of the S615 class all do the job; the deciding factors are which CPU you have and which side initiates each connection.

    OT cybersecurity

  • Troubleshooting

    Fix CODESYS MQTT TLS peer verification handshake failure

    Enabling peer verification in the MQTT client's TLS context fails because the controller has no trust anchor for the broker's certificate chain. Import the issuing CA certificate into the runtime's trusted certificate area through the security screen; the client identity .pfx does not provide that trust. A TCP_Init error is an earlier socket-layer fault, so check endpoint settings before touching certificates.

    Edge computing and IIoT