OT cybersecurity
OT cybersecurity: segmentation, hardening and access control.
Latest articles
How-to
Segmenting edge platform networks for data, BMC and OS traffic
Three interfaces are the right starting point, but they isolate nothing by themselves. Put data on the industrial segment, BMC and OS management on a restricted management segment reached only from named administrative systems, feed updates through approved destinations instead of the open Internet, and disable host forwarding so the edge computer cannot bridge zones. IEC 62443-3-2 frames these boundaries as zones and conduits; every crossing needs an explicit rule.
Checklist
Verify SCADA data and command paths before assuming an attack
Most wrong or frozen SCADA values are tag, binding or driver faults, not attacks. Compare the display, the SCADA tag with its quality and timestamp, and the controller value: agreement clears the data path, and only unexplained writes or unauthorized reachability justify a cyber investigation.
Checklist
Checklist to vet hardware key remote access for OT security
Accept a hardware key remote access product only on evidence: demand the tunnel protocol and cipher suite, prove the no-inbound-ports claim with a deny-all firewall test on a mirrored host, and keep the paired host in the industrial DMZ as the one door to the floor. Reject any product whose vendor cannot name its cryptography or whose revocation depends on the endpoint.
Explainer
IEC 62443-4-1 certificate versus compliance claim for gateways
A compliance statement is the manufacturer's own claim; an IEC 62443-4-1 certificate is an independent attestation of the development lifecycle, with a scope and validity. Neither certifies your installed gateway configuration, so neither by itself replaces a penetration test: request and verify the certificate, and keep the test unless the customer's security authority accepts the alternative in writing.
How-to
Segregating machine drive traffic from the plant network
Put every machine node on managed switches with IGMP snooping and exactly one active querier per machine VLAN, and make the plant path cross a Layer 3 routing hop — a Layer 3 switch or a NAT firewall — because a VLAN tags traffic but never routes between 192.168.1.x and 10.10.1.x. Hold multicast-only drives such as the PowerFlex 40 at 100 ms RPI: its serial DSI back-end caps updates near 35 ms.
How-to
Networking a DOS CNC control to Windows 10 safely
Connect the DOS control to a dedicated Windows 10 Ethernet adapter, leave that adapter on its public (unidentified) profile, serve one shared folder over SMB1 on a static 192.168.10.0/24 link with no gateway, and allow inbound SMB only from that subnet. The shop side keeps its private profile and firewall, the control maps the share as F:, and the whole link stays off the internet.
Comparison
Connect a PLC to the plant network without exposing drives
Keep the PLCs, HMIs and drives on one dedicated machine subnet and connect it upward through exactly one controlled boundary. A routed firewall, a second Ethernet interface such as the CP 1243-1, or a 1:1 NAT switch of the S615 class all do the job; the deciding factors are which CPU you have and which side initiates each connection.
Comparison
Why layered OT security controls protect a network path
No single control secures an OT request path. Network reachability, session protection, user identity and host hardening each block a different failure, so commissioning verifies them in that order: route first, then TLS and certificates, then login and role permissions, then the hardened baseline. A host that answers a connection proves none of the other three.